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I. Introduction
"For all the talk and the public curiosity about the relations between
business and politics, there is a remarkable dearth of studies on the
subject. What is written is more likely to come from the pen of a
sociologist, an historian, a lawyer, or an economist than from a
political scientist" (R. Dahl, 1959).
The description above made by professor Dahl, writing about the topics in
the United States three decades ago, could be perfectly valid for the Spanish
situation even in our days: Antonio Ramos Oliveira, Manuel Tuñón or Mercedes
Cabrera, all of them historians; Juan Velarde, Ramón Tamames, Fermín de la Sierra,
J. García Delgado, Juan Muñoz and Santiago Roldán, economists; and Amando de
Miguel, Carlos Moya, Salvador Giner, Victor Pérez Díaz, Carlota Solé or Salvador
Aguilar, sociologists, have occupied their minds with this subject and published on
these matters. But the nomina of political scientists writing about it is extremely short
and significatively enough -with the noteworthy exception of Juan Linz, who
nevertheless could be considered as a sociologist too- until the late eighties none of
them were researching in this case about the more recent periods but on the Second
Spanish Republique or earlier periods: Isidre Molas, Manuel Ramírez, both of them
coming from and teaching in a Law School. Considering the short history of Political
Science as an autonomous discipline in Spain and the really small size of the
Political Science community in our country (not more than fifty permanent professors
defining themselves as political scientists just a couple of years ago) there is nothing
really surprising in that.
Nevertheless, both the final institutional takeoff of this discipline in 1984 and
its academic expansion through a process of creation of new Schools of Political
Science starting 1987 (Barcelona, Granada, Madrid-UNED, etc.) could contribute to
change substantially this panorama in a few years. Recent works by younger political
scientists (Molins, 1989; Llera, 1990) seems to prove that such a sort of expectatives
is not completely unreasonable.
Meanwhile, for the modest purpose of this paper -to give an account of the
main findings on the topic among us as well as the gaps to be filled- we are partly
benefiting of the work done by specialists of other disciplines, mainly Sociology. We
are found particularly useful the research made by Linz and De Miguel after
conducting a survey among Spanish entrepreneurs in the years 1959-1960, the one
by Robert E. Martínez -from Yale University- based on two surveys conducted in
1981-1982 in the most industrial regions of Spain (one among the chief executive
officers of 259 firms and the other among the leaders of 115 employers associations
-including the AEB, the banking association-, all of the latter affiliated to the peak
employer association, the CEOE) and the most recent by Pérez Díaz, who analises
the opinions and attitudes of a representative sample of the Spanish entrepreneurs in
1984, after more than a year of the Socialists in government at state level.
Additional considerations must be made refering to what we are going to
understand by "business" in these pages. So, we emphasize that we are dealing
basically with organised management, without necessarily excluding some specific
references to individual attitudes or personal relations of members of the industrial or
financial bourgeoisie with government, either at cabinet of parliament level.
II.1. The collective representation of business interests under the authoritarian
regime
An initial legal framework for the economic interest articulation including
labor, was set in Spain by the turn of the century, once the right of association was
regulated by law in 1887, not without some restrictions against anarchist and
collectivist labor organizations. Nevertheless, the first essays of the industrial
bourgeoisie in order to organize its potential constituencies, as on the unions side,
virtually failed. The industrial groups were linked more to individual politicians than
with either of the two system parties introduced with the "Restauración" in 1875,
liberals and conservatives, the exception being the Catalan business, closely tied
with the Lliga Regionalista (vid. Molas, 1972). As professor Linz has argued,
emphasizing the historical weakness of Spanish nationwide interest organizations as
a whole, "in a largely agrarian and underdeveloped society, organised interest groups
were less important than the personal and family links between the political class and
large landowners, bankers, railroad magnates, and many industrialists. Their number
and the concentration of weath made organised interests less necessary than in
other societies with a larger bourgeoisie" (1981, p. 372). Particularly significant in this
regard was the absolute superiority and predominance of the private banking sector
with respect to the industrial enterprise and the monopolistic and oligarchic character
of that banking system. As a result, the Spanish industrialization process was
chanalised almost exclusively by the big banks -the siete grandes- in terms much
more important than in other European countries (J. Muñoz, 1970, chaps IV and VII).
The Dictatorship inaugurated by the general Primo de Rivera in 1923 put an
end to the liberal political system and introduced some corporatist policies and
practices that would allow to speak of some kind a social corporatism, rather than
state corporatism, to use Schmitter's terms (Ph. Schmitter, 1974). As a result, the
representation of interests was institutionalised through the participation of business
and labor in a plurality of public advisory and regulatory organisms. Moreover, the
slow down of class conflict on a state level and the character basically reformist of
the stronger unions "did not force employers to develop a nationwide organization;
regional, local, and sectoral economic interest groups remained outside larger
representative bodies. The rapid economic development of a few successful
enterprises within a protected market facilitated monopolistic tendencies" (Linz,
1981, p. 379).
Under the II Republic, real socioeconomic interests were going to know a
certain integration in effective membership organizations, the rise of the first
nationwide employers federation -the Unión Nacional Económica, founded in
December 1931-being the most significant change on the business side, despite its
low activity in this period. Nevertheless, this was a secondary phenomenon
considering the intensity of social and ideological conflicts in those years, only
exceptionally expressed through such articulated channels (Linz, 1981, pp.
382-386).
Thereby, the institutionalization of economic interest groups unsuccessfully
articulated, had been precarious before the breaking out of the civil war. Under the
three different political regimes that the country had know from 1875 relationships
between Spanish entrepreneurs and the Spanish state could be characterised,
roughly speaking, by a pauta of interchange in which the entrepreneurs asked the
political class, and normally obtained, a double protection: on the one hand, a
protection against the threat of an open development of the free market system and,
on the other hand, the defence against the threat of the labour pressure (V. Pérez
Díaz, 1985, p. 6). To some extent, behind this situation there was from the beginning
of the century a permanent attempt to build some kind of corporatist system through
different practices and policies, some of them implemented even by the governments
of the Second Republic (Velarde, 1984).
The Francoist dictatorship has been frequently presented as a case of
corporatism, the regime defining itself through its laws -i.e., the Fuero del Trabajo of
1938, the law of Unidad Sindical of 1940 or the Ley de Cortes of 1943- and
ideologues in such terms, at least in its first stages. It would be reasonable to ask
ourselves about the nature and entity of that corporatism. While Linz has argued that
it was a state corporatism as an instrument of planning and a corporatism as an
instrument for the collective representation both condemned to failure for structural
reasons, a corporatism that would clearly fit Stepan's model of "exclusionary" state
corporatism rather than the "inclusionary" based on fascist ideological commitments
(1981, pp. 392 and 403), Giner and Sevilla assert than, even if Spanish fascist
corporatism was largely a "sham", some of fascist-corporatist features were held,
being incorporated to the Leyes Fundamentales (1984, pp. 117-119). Some other
author has been much more categorical, arguing for Franco's highly institutionalised
corporatist strategy (Forewaker, 1987, pp. 51 ss.).
Regarding the specific institutional framework for the collective
representation of business interests, the Ley sobre Unidad Sindical of January 1940
would attempt to introduce a monopoly of the representative function according to the
state corporatism model. The Vertical Syndicate was the sole interest organization
"with enough personality" recognised by the new state. Any other economic interest
association was formally incorporated to the Spanish Syndical Organization (articles
1-2). This integration of the economic associations -business and labours as well as
the professionals- was already announced almost two years before by the Fuero del
Trabajo (March 1938) which emphasized the functions of articulation and integration
of interests to be played by these organisms (Linz and de Miguel, 1966, pp. 1314).
In keeping with corporatist philosophies, the "horizontal" trade unions were
outlawed and replaced by 27 "vertical" syndicates, representing the different
economic sectors -such as textil, building metals, chemicals, banking, etc. Chief
executive officers, managers or technicians, as well as common workers, were to be
represented by a single syndicate.
However, trade associations -the Cámaras de Comercio, Industria y
Navegación- obviously connected with the entrepreneur interests were allowed to
remain legally independent and completely outside of the syndical structure (Cf.
Molins, 1989). Futhermore, if the institutional framework for the interest
representation already permitted some legal exceptions, in fact -as has been
documented by the study by Linz and de Miguel- a continued system of parallel
employer organizations acted for the most part independent of the Sindicato Vertical.
While officially covered to some extent under its rubric, these organizations
approximated the functions of entrepreneur interest groups in more pluralist regimes
(1966, pp. 17-18).
The research by Linz and de Miguel among the chief executives of 460
corporations, conducted just at the start of the Spanish economic takeoff period,
included a review of the 71 entities which integrated the UNE (Unión Nacional
Económica) the peak employer association of the II Republic. Of these, 26 continued
to exist at the time of their study: 16 in Madrid, 6 in Barcelona and 4 in the Basque
Country (1966, p. 8). Beside these organizations already existing before the civil war,
others emerged during the Franco period either in "more or less tenue relation" with
the Syndical Organization or, primarily, adopting the legal form of a "sociedad
anónima" (corporation), but doing all the functions of a pressure group (Linz and de
Miguel, 1966, p. 18). Survey-based research commissioned in 1966 by the OECD
and the Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social (the Spanish Planning
Commissariat at the time) in Andalucía, conducted by Eberhard Düller, also made
reference to the extra official collective interest bodies then active (Robert E.
Martinez, 1984, p. 79).
To sump up, under Francoism and in matter of collective interest
representation there was a significant distance between theory and practice. Which
by no means allows us to undervalue the role played by the official unions. To put it
in the words of Linz, summarizing years later one of the main findings in his research
with de Miguel on the Spanish business elite, the "impression is that sindicatos
nacionales with formally identical functions developed very differently from the forties
to the end of the regime. Some of them remained ineffective bureaucratic patronage
organizations, others became technocratic instruments by performing some of the
functions of real interests groups, such as gathering information; helping the
business community, particularly smaller business and exporters; and serving as a
channel for demands before the state bureaucracy and later before the committees
of Cortes -the legislature created in 1943 where they would be represented. In some
instances they became organizations closely connected to the informal leaders of the
business community and were at their service" (1981, p. 391).
II.2. Business attitudes and behaviour
Concerning business attitudes of Spanish entrepreneurs regarding to the
Franco regime we are short of data permitting us to reach reliable conclusions.
Certainly survey findings are available on the opinions of Spanish businessmen
about that political system, but the correspondent surveys had been unvaryingly
conducted years after the death of Franco, in a democratic context (we are making
reference to these opinions in point III.1.). Obviously enough, we can't rest on these
findings to argue seriously on the topic. Hence, for this period, on the one hand, we
are dealing with the specific question of employer opinions on associability in and
outside of the syndical structure on the basis of Linz and de Miguel data. On the
other hand, we are going to suggest some reasonable hypothesis on business
feeling and attitudes on Francoism in its different stages.
Under Francoism the firms established in Spain had the possibility of being
associated to a variety of entities public or private, that Linz and de Miguel
summarized in six sections: the respective national union, the syndical subgroup -i.e.
the subgroup Empresas de Obras Públicas de Ambito Nacional (corporations of
Public works at state level)-, the local Chamber of Commerce, Industry and
Navigation, the consorcio -more or less official and ranging from international groups
such as the International Cotton Federation to other merely local-, the regional
associations or ligas and those already mentioned industrialist associations taking
the legal form of a "sociedad anónima" (1966, pp. 28-29).
When asked "to which of the numerous organizations -public or private-
Colegios (professional associations), Chambers, Unions Consortium, etc., that serve
-or attempt to serve- the interest of economy do you belong or your corporation
belong", most entrepreneurs mentioned various entities, particularly the respective
Sindicato Nacional -79%- and the Cámara de Comercio (or Industria) y Navegación,
depending on what province they were dealing with) -71%-. Two findings were the
most significant: first, the high diversity of entities; and, second, that many of them
failed to mention the Sindicato or the Cámara -21 and 29% respectively- that were
the sole entities to which they were obliged to become members and those legally in
charge of representing their interests (pp. 27-32).
Moreover, when the industrialists were asked what entities they considered
most closely connected with the defence of their interests, none of those entities
received more than 26%, which was a clear sign of the great dispersion of the
activities of defence of interests among the most various bodies (the Sindicatos
appeared in the first position followed by the "Subgrupos"). As for active participation,
it was extremely low: less than 8% in the Sindicatos and 6% in the Consorcios, and
minimal in the Ligas (only 2%) (pp. 33-34).
In general, the data for the total employers sample reflected considerable
apathy and lack of opinion and, further, a fragmentation in the climate of employer
opinion (pp. 34 and 71). Beside the particular sector to which the firm belonged the
most significant differences concerning the Syndical unions were connected with
factors such as the size of the firm and its geographic location: "The smaller
businessmen in the less industrialized regions found in the sindicatos the possibility
to make themselves heard, where as the large entrepreneurs in the advanced
industrial regions, with their contacts with top-level national elites and their
independent, specialized interest groups, had less need for and less confidence in
the sindicatos" (Linz, 1981, p. 388).
Starting from the data and analysis offered by Linz and de Miguel it is
possible to conclude that there is enough evidence of the wide distance between
entrepreneurs and public powers in this middle stage of Francoism. In general, the
industrialists felt themselves greatly distant from the political decisions making
processes including those related to the economic policy (Pérez Díaz, .1985, p. 7).
Nevertheless, in no way Francoism can be considered as a static regime
through its long-lasting life. From the point of view we are adopting here, the years
1957-1959 were the bracket between a first stage which was basically autarchic and,
a second one, characterized by a spectacular economic growth as a result of the
economic liberalization process opened in February 1957 with the entry of Opus Dei
technocrats in the new government and followed by Spain moving towards fuller
international integration, becoming a member of the CEDE, the IMF, and the World
Bank, and, specially, by the 1959 Stabilization Plan. (Giner and Sevilla, 1984, pp.
137-138). Consequently, we must paid attention to the fact that the study by Linz and
de Miguel was measuring the entrepreneurs' opinions just when those policies let
their first effects be felt.
It is easy to presume that the closeness between the industrial bourgeoisie
and the regime was much larger through the autarchic period, even if the economic
growth was extremely low. As a matter of fact, after the civil war the country knew a
return to a situation in which the majority of Spanish active population was occupied
in the agrarian sectors (51.9% in 1940, against 46.1% in 1930) (Anuario Económico
y Social de España, 1977, p. 212). Only in the late 1940's was there a return to the
normal process: a "proto-industrial situation" (Tuñón de Lara, 1973, p. 49), in which
the population occupied in the industrial, building and service sector represented
19.2%, 5.3% and 25%, respectively, adding up to 49.5%, compared to 48.9%
occupied in the Agrarian sector (1950 census).
While the entrepreneurs saw the sinking of the internal market and hardly
supported intensive state interventionism, they were in favour of the protectionist
policy and they felt free of labour pressures, enjoying both low salaries -real salaries
in the early fifties were still 50% below the prewar level- and a garanteed social
peace through the regime tight control of the working class. Certainly the main
beneficiaries of Franco military victory were other particular sectors of the upper
class, the latifundio owners and the financial aristocracy: the first, obtaining either the
devolution of their lands or being liberated both from the pressures of the jornaleros
(non-owners peasants) and government threast of expropiation: the financial
aristocracy, taking advantage of the difficult economic situation of the 1940's that
significatively allowed the five most important banks to grow extremely, increasing
their annual benefits approximately, in a 700% and gave them the control of
approximately 65% of the financial resources mobilized in Spain in 1950 (Fermín de
la Sierra, 1953). The political significance of the Spanish financial aristocracy, a
"national ruling class" emerging through a long process of mutual penetration of the
financial bourgeoisie and the aristocracy that started with the liberal Disentailment of
the XIX Century (C. Moya, 1975), was seen in the financing of the Francoist uprising
by the Bank of Spain, largely under the control of this fraction of the bourgeoisie from
1875 until the Bank was nationalized in 1962 (J.M. Maravall, 1981, pp. 21-22).
However, the intensity of class conflict before and during the civil war undoubtedly
aligned most entrepreneurs, including owners of medium and small sized firms with
those other social sectors economically -and traditionally- more powerful.
The situation was substantially altered in the late 1960's and in the early
1970's. By these years a new industrial bourgeoisie and a wave of "new directors" in
the banking and industrial sectors -including the growing "new state bourgeoisie"
linked to the INI (Instituto Nacional de Industria) (Giner and Sevilla, 1980, p 213)- as
well as in the Public Administration have risen as a result of the economic
development, creating greater fragmentation and heterogeneity within the ruling class
(Maravall, 1981, pp. 21-22).
In a parallel way, a new working class with relatively high levels of income
had emerged (Cf. I. Fernández de Castro and A. Goytre, 1974, pp. 306-307). The
character of the working class threat to the industrial and financial bourgeoisie had
been transformed by that relative prosperity.
In this framework of socio-structural changes there was a shift in the
attitude and behaviour of employers, looking increasingly for agreements on wages
and productivity through unofficial negotiations and collective bargaining with the
clandestine unions, that is to say, outside the official channels. To some extent, the
industrialists were beginning a process of conversion to what they themselves called
"the Western political model" (Giner and Sevilla, 1980, pp. 218-219).
Two solid reasons for dissatisfaction of the members of industrial and
financial bourgeoisie with the political institutions of Francoism has been suggested
by British historian Paul Preston: a) while many members of the economic elite had
hopes of integration the working class into the capitalist system by means of a
reward-based economy, they felt that their hopes will be frustrated as long as the
only method of expressing political preference open to workers was the strike; b)
their view of those institutions as a major obstacle to further economic development,
particularly regarding to Spain's relations with the EEC, since entry in Europe
required democratization (P. Preston, 1976, pp. v-vi).
This kind of arguments could lead to the conclusion that these upper social
sectors were coming clearly closer in their activities to the traditional opposition
forces. However, I prefer Linz's point of view when he writes that there is "little
evidence that business groups played an active role in favor of or against the political
transformation in this period and even less evidence of structural alignments for or
against change". Certainly there were contacts between opposition leaders and some
business leaders who, however, felt that they did not want to compromise their
interests by coming into conflict with the state" (Linz, 1981, p. 394).
There is still another question to be considered: the entity of the direct
political participation of representatives of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie in
the high levels of the Franco Administration. It is noteworthy that while a significant
percentage of the members of the initial military Junta de Defensa Nacional -15%-
and a even higher proportion -20%- of the presidents of the various commissions that
made up the Junta Técnica del Estado (a seudocivilian cabinet created by Franco in
October 1936) were recruited among those fractions of the bourgeoisie (Viver, 1978,
p. 243), subsequently -once the regime started its institutionalization and at least for
the next two decades- that participation was going to decrease remarkably. In fact,
only 8% of the first Franquist elite -understanding by such elite the individuals
appointed to any office at the three highest levels of the Administration, from director
general to cabinet member, between February 1938, date of the first cabinet, and
February 1957- occupied positions on the board of directors of any industrial firm or
bank (Jerez, 1982, p. 134).
From the Stabilization Plan of 1959 this situation changed substantially
representatives of big business and the industrial bourgeoisie were appointed to
cabinet posts in a significant number and during the sixties the employers covered
more than one third of the positions in the Cortes, the Francoist seudolegislative
body (de Miguel, 1975, p. 73). As the regime advanced, members of the industrial
and financial bourgeoisie increasingly rose to high positions in the government. By
the early seventies the Council of Ministers overwhelmingly consisted of such
individuals (Gunther, 1980, p. 8)
There was, of course, the other way: the new political class from the very
beginning started to move to the seats of the boards of directors, both of the newly
founded industrial firms of the public sector dependent of the INI and the public
banks as well as the boards of private corporations and banks. Some data may
illustrate that process; for example, between 1940 and 1950 the proportion of
members of the first Francoist elite -as described above- occupying seats on the
board of directors of a corporation or a bank rose from 12.7% to 33.2%, and by 1960
that proportion was 41.3 (Jerez, 1982, pp. 137-138). Nevertheless, with the exception
of the INI firms, the presence of the new political class on the boards of directors of
the industrial and banking systems did not allow those individuals to control these
corporations, "but, rather, gave the old business elite access to the new power
holders" (Linz, 1981, p. 391). In short, as has been argued by Viver, the progressive
links established between political elites and big business was the main way to
restore the traditional imbrication between the ruling class and the political class,
momentarily interrupted (1978, p. 267).
III.1. Employer associability under the new institutional framework
Employer organizations in Spain obtained full institutionalization at a legal
level in the framework of the 1978 Constitution, which draws a model of pluralistic
democracy on the double base of a state defined as "social and democratic" (Article
1.1) and of the recognition of the free market system (Article 38), although
introducing both the possibility of public planning and the right for State intervention
(Articles 38, 128 and 131). Article 7 of the Constitution recognizes explicitly both
"labor unions" and "employer associations" as economic and social actors assigning
them a role of "defence and promotion" of the interests which they represent in these
fields and providing legal garanties for their creation and for the exercice of their
activities. While not directly attributing them a political role, unlike that made for
political parties (Article 6), the Constitution, starting on the content of the same article
7 and others (i.e., 127.1 and 131.2), would allow us to speak in terms of political
subjects, even on a formal level, relating to employer associations as well as trade
unions (Palomeque, 1985, pp. 57-62).
The emergence of the current system of employer organizations had been
already opened by the April 1977 government decision to dismantle the Vertical
Syndicate (definitely abolished in June, the month of the first parliamentary
elections) and to passing a law which legalized the labor unions (Ley sobre
regulación del derecho de asociación sindical) that could be of use to those
organizations since reference to free associability for employers as well as workers
was made in it. It was just this law which introduced i pattern that has been observed
in representational matters affecting the "labor of work" during the transition, the
Constitution included as we have seen in article 7: the pattern of refering in the same
norm to both labor unions and employer associations (R. Martinez, 1984, p. 9).
The Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE),
the peak association for the business side, was formally created at the end of June
1977, just two weeks after the first general elections were held in the framework of
that April legislation. However, significant efforts in order to reorganize the employers
had been already made from November 1975, once Franco' death clearly showed
that the end of his regime was imminent, as the old system of collective interest
representation would consequently be finished. In fact, this period that has been
typified as "protoorganizative" knew various employer initiatives developed through
four main lines of action (Aguilar, 1985, pp. 60-61):
a) The revitalization of historical owners organizations, which have play an
almost purely formal role under Francoism, as was the cape of the Catalan Fomento
del Trabajo Nacional (FTN), which began to function again in October 1976.
b) The creation of employer organizations linked to the remains of the
Sindicato Vertical, looking for the capitalization of the available infrastructure in order
to negotiate the participation in the future peak employer associations: for instance,
the Confederación General Española de Empresarios was founded in May 1977
following this strategy.
c) The creation of employers associations linked to cliques of industrialists
enjoying a dominant position in one or more economic sectors or in a particular
geographic zone. The foundation of the powerful Circulo de Empresarios or the
Confederación Empresarial Española , (in March and May 1977, respectively) and the
creation of SEFES (in 1975 as an instrumental of business interest defence in a
particularly conflictive Catalan area) responded to this line of action.
d) Propagandistic activities -such as newspaper articles, conferences,
encounters, advertisements, etc.- in order both to promote the organization of
business interests and to justify its necessity with regard to society.
The reactive character of the entrepreneur associationism -sufficiently
documented for other countries- was particularly evident in this first period, the
positions of industrialists being eminently defensive (Martínez and Pardo Avellaneda,
1985, pp. 92-93; and Aguilar, 1985, p. 61). The creation of the CEOE by the fusion of
four employer organizations (Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, Agrupación Empresarial
Independiente, Confederación General Española de Empresarios y Confederación
Empresarial Española) represent the opening of a new stage in which two were the
aims efficaciously pursued: on the one hand, a certain consolidation of a
entrepreneurial bureaucracy representing consistently the interests of those sectors
of big business more in favour of the democratic transition; on the other hand, a
satisfactory level of stable affiliation now obviously voluntary. The first objective was
finally reached through the reelection in November 1978 of Ferrer Salat as president
of the CEOE, heading a large Junta Directiva (50 members) and a homogeneus
Comité Ejecutivo  (6 persons) where the most right-wing members were excluded; the
second, through the so-called "actos de afirmación empresarial", a practice that
would be abandoned in 1979 once those aims were reached: the gathering of
thousands of employers in a big city (Barcelona, Valencia, and Madrid were the
scene of the most important of them) with the additional aims of giving internal
cohesion to the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie by means of its massive mobilization and
obtaining the respect of Government as a differentiated power (Aguilar, pp. 62-63).
The period 1979-1980 means the institutional consolidation of the
employers organizations, a consolidation that would be corroborated through the
years 1981/1984, even if the political scene was much more complex (Pérez Díaz,
1985, p. 11).
Two were the most significant signs of consolidation through the mentioned
period: on the one hand, the incorporation, in March 1980, into the CEOE' ranks of
CEPYME, the Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium Firms, which enhanced
the hegemonic position of the first and put an end to the most important division in
the employer associationism. Although all firms were theoretically represented by the
CEOE. The CEPYME presented itself as the defender of the specific interests and
views of smaller enterprises, even if on the whole its mutual relations were more
complementarial than adversarial. While the formula adopted gave to the CEPYME
"a unique position as neither a sectorial nor provincial or regionally-defined
intersectorial (territorial) affiliate, but, rather, as a State-wide peak affiliate for smaller
firms" (Martínez, 1984, p. 31), it was practically absorbed inside the CEOE (Aguilar,
1985, p. 63). On the other hand, the signing of the Basic Interconfederal Agreement
(AMI) of January 1980 by the CEOE and the Socialist union, UGT (Unión General de
Trabajadores) which had the character of a public bilateral agreement between both
organizations facing such significant questions as salaries, productivity, collective
bargaining and labor conflictivity (Martínez and Pardo, 1985, p. 84). This pact
represent the triumph of a policy already expressed by the July 1979 agreement
between the same two organizations, a strategy tending both to avoid the emergence
of a syndical block and to produce the decrease of the labor union "of communist
inspiration" CCOO, in favour of UGT, through the introduction of social pacts of
bilateral nature with those unions accepting the terms proposed by the employer
organization (the AMI was later signed by USO, the third largest union, to some
extent then close to the UCD, at that time the party in government). However, the
triumph of this operation, materialized in the effects of the AMI implementation
-basically, a slow down in the labor conflictivity and a substantial rising of UGT in the
following unions elections-, was not an exclusive merit of the CEOE. Two external
factors contributed to it: first, the objetive interests of the major political parties at the
time, UCD and PSOE, respectively interested in reaching a distension in, the labor
word as well as in emphasizing bipartidism, and -in the case of the PSOE- in winning
a significant union basis that would be extremely useful in the then hypothesis of an
electoral victory; second, the presence of increasingly weighty reformist sectors in the
Spanish worker movement that consequently showed a certain receptivity to that
strategy (Aguilar, 1985, pp. 81-83, and Pérez Díaz, 1981).
The signing of this type of social pacts between the employer organizations
and the trade unions as well as the tendence to corporatist intermediation was going
to shape a certain pattern in Spain, apparently interrupted in 1987. The Moncloa
Pacts signed in October 1977 by the major political parties were the first essay along
these lines and the sole occasion in which the CEOE, by this time a weak
organization which hadn't even existed for four months, was excluded (as a matter of
fact it would take advantage of the circumstance, stiring up the entrepreneurs and
achieving its first affiliates through the attack on the contents of these agreements).
Although the unions were formally excluded too, the workers's commissions and the
UGT -the two big trade unions- in fact respected this comprehensive political pact
that put strong emphasis in economic measures because of its close links with the
Communist Party and the Socialist Party, respectively (the labor organizations) were
initially against the deal, arguing that they had not been consulted but in the end they
gave their consent -withdrawn by CCOO the following year-basically because of the
need "to consolidate democracy".
Still prior to the AMI -to be applied through 1980/1981- the already
mentioned July 1979 agreement between the CEOE and the UGT was sighed. The
first three-part agreement, the Acuerdo Nacional sobre el Empleo (ANE), was
reached in 1981 by the Government, the CEOE and both the UGT and the CCOO.
But we must pay attention to the fact that this first purely neocorporatist agreement of
the Spanish transition had an immediate and clear motivation: the attempt of coup
d'état of 23-February (Hence, once again the protection of the democratic system
was playing a decisive factor in obtaining the unions consensus) (Cf. Forewaker,
1987, pp. 66-67).
While the Interconfederal Agreement (AI) signed in 1983 -the year following
the Socialist Party's access to the State government- between the CEOE and the
UGT had the same character (and the same protagonist) as the AMI, a more
complicated agreement was reached in 1984 to be applied through the next two
years: the Economic and. Social Agreement (AES). Its text includes three parts: a
statement made by the Cabinet (declaración del Gobierno) on fiscal pressure, public
deficit, financiation of the private sector, etc., in which the idea of a pact was not
explicitly present; a three-part agreement (Government, CEOE and UGT) containing
economic concessions by each signatory part; and a new interconfederal agreement
where both the Government and -more significantly- the workers' commissions were
absent. Just as the AMI, the text was inserted in the Boletín Oficial del Estado, the
official state journal, trying to give it further efficacy and a certain institutionalization
(Sagardoy, 1984, and Antón, 1984). No other large social agreement has been
achieved since then in spite of some government efforts in this sense through out
1987, the main change in the political panorama being the open differences between
the Socialist government and the UGT as well as the approximation of the Socialist
labor union to the CCOO resulting February 1988 in a return to the old days of the
"unity of action" as can be seen in the defence of common platforms in most firms
and sectors by the two major unions. Late in that year (December, 14th) the
convergence of both unions in the successful convocatory of the first general strike
against a PSOE cabinet represented the peak of a process subsequently attenuated,
mainly because electoral differences in the union field.
The high organizational continuity is one of the more characteristic feature
of the present Spanish employer associationism. While the CEOE superstructure was
completely new, the same can't always be said of its member associations, even if
the forms of continuity varied, going beyond Francoism in regions with a longer
industrial tradition, particularly Catalonia (Martínez, 1984, pp. 20-21, 83-84 and
484-485). That continuity has been measured through survey techniques, offering the
following results: a 59% of the employer organizations existing in 1982 had worked
-in different ways- in the framework of the Organización Sindical; 9% were created
under Francoism, although operating outside the vertical union; 10% were
associations older than the Francoist regime operating de facto independently from it
during that period; and, finally, one association was born before the civil war,
maintaining itself in a latent state through the dictatorship and emerging during the
transition. Thereby, only 21% of the organizations were created ex-novo after the
breakdown of Franco regime (Martínez and Pardo, 1985, pp. 99-100).
Regarding the structure and effective of the Spanish hegemonic employer
association, the CEOE, in March 1985 it was integrated by 114 sectorial
organizations (state-wide), 48 territorial intersectorial organizations (provincial or
regional) and CEPYME, which amounted to 163 associations/federations affiliated.
The CEOE statutes don't allow either lower level base organizations or individual
firms to become direct members. According to its own sources, the Confederación
would represent 3.500 base organizations and almost 1.100.000 firms, although the
last number seems to be exaggerated (Rijnen, 1985, p. 116). By this time the CEOE
had a staff of 78 employees, including 45 graduates, most of them lawyers and
above all economists. While there is a certain tendency to expansion in these
effectives, the Confederación doesn't seem to want to follow the British or the
German pattern in this point. It would prefer to opt for specific contracts or external
professional services when it is necessary besides strengthening the affiliate
organizations.
III.2. Business attitudes and behaviour
According to the methodology used in the research, the approaches to this
topic are mainly two: on the one hand, those approaches based on the analysis of
the daily press and journals as well as the employers organizations' documentation
(statutes, memories, etc.). On the other hand, those others making a direct
investigation through survey techniques among both individual entrepreneurs and
association leaders.
An example of the first line of research is the one by Aguilar (1985) who
made three main considerations regarding "actions and attitudes" of organized
management concerning the democratic system during the transition: a) its amazing
low definition, at least until 1981, on such a significant question as the political -and
consequently labour- framework; b) its immediate reaction in favour of the democratic
system in the days following the "golpe" of February 1981, although the clearly
majoritarian statements made by employer leaders alternated with some others of
opposite sign; and c) the purely instrumental view of the democratic system shown
by the employer organization to the extent that the patronal aligns itself with that
system (as it would be otherwise the case in other advanced capitalist countries) (pp.
71-73). The same author emphasizes two outstanding functions assumed by the
organized management through those years: the attempt to create a stable and
hegemonic political right and the task of giving a certain cohesion to the business
class. Consistent with this double aim the CEOE had to play an intense and unusual
interventionist role in the political system, and it did indeed (pp. 73-77).
Regarding the specific and peculiar relations between the CEOE and the
UCD while the last was the party in government, three phases could be
distinguished:
a) 1977-1978, characterized by the above mentioned "actos de afirmación
empresarial" in protest against the Moncloa Pacts and the governments economic
policies in general; b) 1978-1979, a phase -defined by an important employer leader
as "critical collaboration"- in which the relationship was more functional, and that it
seems to show a beginning of acceptation of the UCD as the hegemonic party of the
Spanish right-wing, the conflicts with the executive being strategically selected; and
c) the phase of a definitive deterioration, opened in 1980 coinciding with the political
failure of the UCD policy in Andalucía with relation to the referendum on an
autonomous regime for that region and the poor results obtained by the party in the
regional elections held in March in Catalonia and Euskadi; a phase in which three
were the key moments, unvariably registering a clear intervention of the CEOE: the
first minister resignation in January 1981; the so called strategy of la gran derecha
applied through that year pursuing a coalition of the UCD and the Popular Aliance
(AP) under the leadership of Fraga; and the definitive collapse of the UCD as a result
of the October 1982 parliamentary elections in which the party vote descend from
35.1 to 6.8%, loosing 156 deputies of a total of 168 (the employer organizations had
already openly -and efficiently- supported AP in the regional elections held in Galicia
and Andalucía) (pp. 74-77).
As for the other approach that allow us to learn about other specific aspects
of employer opinion and behaviour is concerned, we are using -as was already
mentioned in my introduction- the studies by Robert Martínez (1984) and Víctor
Pérez Díaz (1985), registering business attitudes in 1981/82 and 1984 respectively,
therefore before and after the substitution of the UCD by the PSOE as the party in
government.
The first of these works examines the way in which the transition to a
democratic system had affected the Spanish business sector. At the same time, it
analizes the role played by this social sector, both via the aggregate of individual
decisions and through the activities of its collective interest groups (the employers
associations), in the evolution and consolidation of the democratic regime. Emphasis
is made in continuity with business attitudes in earlier periods as well as in
organizations continuity as a significant element in order to explain current positions.
For the purpose of this paper, and in this point, the analysis made in
chapter five is particularly useful. There, the researcher attempt to asses the degree
of support among Spanish business elite (1) for the previous regime and the level of
acceptance of both the political opening and the consolidation of democracy. His
main conclusions on these matters could be summarized as follows:
-Employers and their collective interest organizations represented by this
time a conservative segment of the Spanish society which overwhelmingly supported
the manner in which the issue of political change was undertaken (through legal
reform rather than open rupture, the so called "reforma pactada"), as well as the
establishment of a legal framework for the new system. Hence, when asked it they
felt that viable alternatives to the reform existed at the time of the transition, most
chiefs executives and employers organizations leaders (70.4% and 65.2%,
respectively) rejected the possibility of political options other than the reform. By
province (2) there were similar proportions in Madrid, Sevilla, Barcelona and Valencia
of individuals who believe that viable alternatives to the reform existed (slightly over a
quarter of them, against a fifth in Vizcaya, in the Basque Country). Nevertheless,
when asked to elaborate their answers the number of such individuals describing non
democratic options varied, being much higher in the two first provinces mentioned
-34.8 and 33.3% respectively- than in Barcelona or Valencia -17.2 and 16.7%
respectively- while non a single individual in the Basque province, already revealing
the lowest percentage of respondents expressing belief in alternatives, chose an
option classifiable as undemocratic. Indeed, attitudes on the reform were closely
related to sentiments regarding the previous regime, but not all those favorable to
Franco who believed alternatives to the reform existed preferred antidemocratic
options in its stead.
-Both heads of firms and leaders of associations participated in the
referendum on the Constitution (December 1978) at levels far exceeding those
registered among the population as a whole: once excluded foreigners from the
samples, over nine-tenths of both groups, compared to a national participation level
of slightly above two thirds. The distance was much larger in the Basque case where,
in a context in which the influential Partido Nacionalista Vasco supported abstention,
businessmen's participation rates almost doubled the overall rate for Vizcaya
province which was only 43.9%. The traditionally strong identification of the Basque
upper bourgeoisie with Madrid, that is to say, the Spanish State, could explain this
significant departure.
However, looking at the actual votes cast on the Constitution there were
not any significant differences with the data for the population at large, except for the
proportion of no votes among the leaders of associations which was around five
points higher (12.6% compared to 7.7%). Otherwise, size of organization appeared
very important in determining leaders support for the Constitution. The more elite the
association, the closer hierarchically to the CEOE leadership, the less likely was to
find "no" voters, a tendency that seems to be explained by the emphasis placed by
the men that led the transition on the idea of a consensual approach negotiated at
the elite level.
-Despite strong and vocal criticism of the Suárez Government by
significant sector of business opinion -particularly in the banking sector- and certain
business leaders, partially attributable to a perceived failure of the Government, both
to accord enough priority to economic policies -comparing with the attention payd to
political matters- and to deal adequately with economic problems, ,they gave a very
strong electoral support to UCD, at least until the 1979 elections.
-A significant portion of businessmen found themselves among the wide
sector of the Spanish population which, without identifying itself ideologically with the
previous regime, had given Francoism its passive support, or was completely
despoliticized, consequently, given the aims of the regime, contributing to its
surviving. Even though the degrees of approbatory assessments drawn regarding
Franco were very high throughout (3), high levels of absolute approval were found
only among AP supporters or individual more closely implicated in the regime, and
along party lines only it is among AP voters that one finds overwhelming approval of
Franco without any significant level of criticism.
-Regarding to electoral behaviour, businessmen showed high levels of
participation and strong support for the UCD in the 1977 and 1979 parliamentary
elections, the strength of the UCD being significantly greater among individual heads
of firms than among their associational leadership, which emerged as somewhat
more conservative than their constituents. Indeed, the two major regional parties -the
Catalan Convergència i Unió and the Basque PNV- garnered important degrees of
support in their respective regions. While levels of support for AP stand at roughly
twice their levels among the whole population, this party was not widely perceived as
a viable and natural alternative over the early years of the democratic system.
Growing support for AP by important sectors of the CEOE' peak leadership,
beginning in 1980 and accelerating over 1981 and 1982, contributed significantly to
the erosion of UCD as well as to the shift of business vote to the other party whose
platform was consistent with conservative business interests.
-Businessmen were willing to deal with the Left if faced with economic
problems in their own firms or sectors. The chief executives of large firms were
particularly open to the possibility of addressing Left deputies or parties
representing workers in order to seek solutions (71%, compared to 53.2% for the
whole sample). Likewise, the chief executives of public sector firms were much
more open to the possibility of dealing with Left representatives if the need arose.
-As for the business sector view on a then hypothetical Socialist
Government, it was found that substantial majorities of both head of firms and
leaders of associations were not worried about the materialization of that possibility
in the Spanish policy. So, only roughly a third of the first and under a quarter of the
leaders believed than a PSOE parliamentary absolute majority would actually lead
to extensive socialization of the country (it would be necessary to emphasize that
the 1982 date of the association survey may have contributed to the diminished fear
of absolute majoritarian Socialist electoral victory). Hence, it appeared already much
more likely that with moderate policies, both González -whose image among chief
executives was very favorable when compared to Suárez or even Fraga- and the
Socialist party would benefit from a rather extensive degree of maneuverability
granted by the business sector.
-On the negative side, there did exist a significant minority of chief
executives who faced with Government policies damaging business interests
-specifically through approved legislation- stated that they would turn to particular
actions which could be typified as virtually anti-system measures: i.e., "bring about a
Constitutional change which would make such legislation impossible" (23.7%) or
"support political sectors willing to bring about fundamental changes in the system"
(32.3%). Moreover, while there was considerable openness to deal with a wide
range of political leaders and institutions, relatively scant confidence that desired
objectives could be reached through networks of existing contacts appeared. In this
respect, the roles to be played by employer organizations seemed to be decisive in
order to shape future attitudes towards the legal means of effecting desired policy
outcomes.
In short, business positions during the transition -which I would say reach
an end when the alternance in power was materialized in October 1982 without any
trouble- could be qualified in general terms as moderately conservative. Likewise, by
the time those positions were evaluated it seems already foreseeable that this social
sector will support rather than oppose the continuing consolidation of democracy in
Spain, provided that once the Socialist were in Government they didn't adopt a
radical policy.
The above mentioned Pérez Díaz ‘ work -and, indeed, the real evolution of
politics in Spain- clearly confirm that foresight. In fact, the results of his 1984
employer opinion allow us to register the evolution of the businessmen opinion (4),
measuring it after more than fifteen months of Socialist Government. There was
various findings in that study which would be pertinent to point out here:
-An overwhelming majority of the employers considered favourably the
PSOE access to power from the point of view of the stability of the political system
(specifically, 80%, compared to an other 20% who were still worried about it).
-While the businessmen's attitude with respect to the PSOE economic
policy had significant components of criticism -particularly regarding public
expenditure- their criticism seems td be less virulent than it was with respect to the
UCD economic policy. They even showed their agreement with some substantial
aspects of that PSOE policy, such as the wage policy, the measures of temporary
hiring and the new lines of industrial reconversion. Most of them thought that
González economic policy was closer to the pragmatism of the German chancellor
Helmut Schmitt (during most of the seventies) than of the economic policy of
François Mitterrand (during his first two years as French President). An outstanding
data reflecting the "smooth" attitude of the employers in this regard was the favorable
image obtained among them -on a 0 to 5 scale- by the then powerful Socialist
minister of Economy and Finance, Miguel Boyer (2.8, less than a point under the
highest scores obtained by Fraga and González -3.68 and 3.66, respectively- and
over other centre or centre-right leaders such as Suárez or Garrigues -2.61 and 2.46,
respectively).
-The employers substantially maintained their negative view with respect to
the Spanish Public Administration, which was criticized for its lack of rationality and
neutrality, and was typified as incompetent. Although the 1982 Socialist electoral
campaign and program put a particularly strong emphasis on the "rationalization" of
the Spanish Public Administration as a crucial aspect of the necessary
"modernization of Spain", only 26% of the interviewed thought that its running had
improved, while 23% stated that it was getting worse and 46% declared that there
wasn't any change.
-As for the electoral behaviour; in 1982, coinciding with the UCD collapse, a
strong shift of the centre-right businessmen votes was registered as well as some
minor readjustments in their preferences for regional parties, or even the PSOE.
According to these survey data, 46.5% of the employers voted for AP, compared to
roughly 25% in 1979, while the UCD and the CDS -the new Suárez party- only
obtained 8 and 4%, respectively, (the UCD business vote in 1979 rose to 44%).
Centre-right regional parties votes rose from roughly a fifth of the business vote in
1979 (12.4 for the Catalan Convergència and 8.4 for the Basque PNV) to 27% (only
Convergència won almost six points because the virtual extintion of UCD in
Catalonia). Finally, the PSOE vote went up from 4.4% -only 2.2 and 2.6% among
employers and leaders of associations, respectively, in the Martínez' surveys- to 8%,
while the extreme right-wing vote (1% in 1979) disappeared.
-By this time, the business class seemed to have dropped both its initial
defensive attitude and consciousness of vulnerability, adopting a more solid
position. The constitutionalization of the free market system, the relatively moderate
position of the labor unions and the partial success of the social pacts, the gradual
improvement of the economic scenary, the changes operated in the political
language and strategy of the PSOE, as well as the development and consolidation
of the own employer organizations were undoubtedly among the most important
factors accounting for this substantial change from the early days of the transition.
On the other hand, regarding the question of businessmen's direct political
participation in the post-Franco Administration, there is full evidence of a massive
presence of unequivocal representatives of the economic power in the two first
Governments of the Monarchy, that is to say, the last Arias Cabinet and the first
Suárez Government (G. Campos, 1976). It appear that in the Government presided
by Arias Navarro the usual correspondence between the group holding the economic
power and those individuals exercising political power at the highest executive level
become even stronger. Its main particularity was given by the fact that while
numerous Cabinet members were linked to private corporations -in which wasn't any
thing new-, these firms were almost invariably characterized by a high percent of
foreign capital participation. As a matter of fact, the conditions set by the foreign
banks -particularly the USA banks- in order to grant ilimited credit to the new
Administration -basically the liberalization of the traditional obstacles to its entry in
Spain and the Spanish private banks' full opposition to it could be among the
decisive factors explaining the fall of this Government (Cf. Campos, pp. 107-108).
With respect to the first Suárez Government, it has been usually typified as
"propagandista", alluding to the dominant presence in it of members of the ACN de P
(Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas), a paraeclesiastic organization
politically protagonist in Spain from the 1920's (Sáez Alba, 1974; and Jerez, 1982,
pp. 28 8 ss.) and closely bound to some industries and, above all, certain private
banks (specially, the Banco Español de Crédito, Banco Central and Banco Urquijo,
ranking second, third and sixth, respectively among the Spanish private banks). At
least, six cabinet posts -Presidency, Foreign Affairs, Treasury, Public Works,
Information and Tourism, and Justice- were covered by men coming from this
organization, most of them showing those economic connections in their
biographies. And, indeed, they were not the sole ministers personally linked to the
banking or the industrial system, as it was respectively the case for the holders of
the Commerce and Industry portfolios (Campos, 1976, p. 114).
Considering the period going from July 1976 to January 1981, which include
the five Suárez Governments, it has been found that at least 38 cabinet members
from a total of 58 had occupied elite positions in industrial firms, and many of them
held direct relations with the banking sector. Naturally, the picture of this political elite
shows an intricate network of relationships with different industrial sectors as well as
the banking system (S'. del Campo et al., 1982, pp. 45-61). Although I don't know any
study covering the Calvo Sotelo Cabinet -the last UCD Government-, it seems highly
improbable that this pattern changed substantially, the Prime Minister being himself a
prominent man of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie. Indeed, that pauta was
broken with the Socialist Governments, even if some of its members maintain
excellent personal relations with the business world.
Much less important was the presence of employers and businessmen in
the Spanish parliament. Thus, in the 1977 Congreso de los Diputados the rate of
entrepreneurs and businessmen was 16.4 (18.3 including farmers), but only roughly
a 10% of the deputies were identified as members of the board of directors of any
firm. Two years later, in the 1979 Congreso these proportions were even lower,
10.6% and 2.5% of deputies appearing as "industrial and agrarian entrepreneurs"
and "traders and small industrialists", respectively (Vid. S. del Campo et al., 1982, pp.
39-46).
NOTES
(1) The 1981 employer -chief executives or head of firms- and the 1982 leader of associations
surveys included 12% and 9% of foreigners respectively, all of them obviously considered
her a as members of the Spanish business elite. The "elite" nature of even the employer
survey arise from the elimination, of firms under fifty workers (the bulk of Spanish
enterprise).
(2) The two business surveys were conducted in industrialized Spain covering provinces of Barcelona,
Madrid, Vizcaya, Valencia and Sevilla, ranking first, second, third, fourth, and eight, respectively
provinces by industrial values added.
(3) 70% among employers and 67% among leaders were generally favorable, but only 5
and 6%, respectively, gave it their total approval.
(4) It must be indicated that the criterium used to select firms, since the sample covered all of them
larger than 20 employers it was less restrictive than that in the Martínez’ head of firms survey. All
the provinces of any industrial importance were included too. Interviews were distributed as follows:
30% in Catalonia, 28% in Madrid, 16% in the Basque Country and 26% in the rest.
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